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JUDGE ACKER'S LAST STAND: THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA'S
LONESOME BATTLE FOR THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY UNDER TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits discriminatory
employment practices2 and provides remedies which include reinstate-
ment' and the recovery of back wages. 4 The Act and its legislative
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1980).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1980). Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, and prohibits segregation of work areas. Id.
§ 2000e-2(a).
3. Reinstatement is an equitable order returning a wrongfully discharged employee
to his or her former position, with constructive or full seniority. See Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (restoring seniority). Difficult issues arise in the com-
mon situation where the employer has replaced the employee entitled to reinstatement.
See Note, Title VII Remedies: Reinstatement and the Innocent Incumbent Employee, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1441-67 (1989).
4. See infra note 23 and accompanying text for Title VII remedies. President Bush
recently vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which would have substantially enlarged
the right to a jury trial in Title VII actions. The amendments would have provided
plaintiffs with the right to pursue compensatory and punitive damages while specifically
granting either party the right to a jury trial when such relief is sought. See H.R. CoNF.
REP. ON S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H8045 (daily ed. Sept. 16,
1990). At the time of publication, Congress and the White House are negotiating for a
compromise version of the bill. See Significant Differences Remain Between Vetoed
Civil Rights Bill and White House Proposal, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214 (Nov. 5,
1990). Should subsequent efforts of amendment succeed in expanding remedies under
Title VII, the seventh amendment analysis in this Note will still apply to situations
where either no compensatory damages (beyond back pay) can be claimed, or where a
plaintiff's claim for damages is dismissed on a motion for summary judgment.
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history do not clearly indicate whether Congress meant for juries to
hear Title VII cases.5 Notwithstanding this uncertainty, federal judges
from the outset denied jury trials6 as a matter of course under the sev-
enth amendment.7 The courts continue to rule in virtual uniformity
against granting jury trials,8 relying on precedent born of a time of
great social upheaval and racial tension.9 This Note will demonstrate
that the time has come to harmonize seventh amendment jurispru-
dence under Title VII with legal and social reality1 o
5. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text discussing legislative history con-
cerning the right to a jury trial.
6. See United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 940 (10th Cir.
1979); Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Detroit
Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
802 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed under rule 60, 494 U.S. 1006 (1971); Harkless v.
Sweeney Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
991 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990). These courts reasoned that the nature of Title
VII's remedies and their interrelationship show that Congress wanted judges to deter-
mine relief in all Title VII cases. Cf Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Tex. 1972) (criticizing the prevailing view at length, but denying jury in conform-
ity with binding precedent). See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text criticizing the
reasoning in these cases.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment guarantees the right to jury
trials as it existed at the time of ratification in 1791. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989). Either party to an action in federal court may petition for
a jury trial on any claim arising at law. Id.
8. See Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (jury heard
section 1981 claim, and judge heard Title VII claim); Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's
Office, 844 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1988)(plaintiff's Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
tried together, but only latter claim submitted to jury); Yatvin v. Madison Metro.
School Dist., 840 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988) (jury heard Title VII claim in advisory ca-
pacity only); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1987) (jury heard tort
claims, and judge heard Title VII claim); Wilson v. City of Aliceville, 779 F.2d 631,
635 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); see also P. Cox, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 21.05,
at 21-23 (1987) (no right to jury trial "[a]s the relief under Title VII is equitable").
9. See generally M. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER 106-251
(1987) (discussing racial violence in the South during the early to mid-1960s).
Although the crisis management of the Kennedy years had kept major race riots
from thwarting judicial enforcement of the Constitution, persistent attacks on voter
registration workers and random acts of terrorism increasingly threatened constitu-
tional rights. Intensifying as 1964 progressed, by midsummer these would push
some parts of the South to the edge of anarchy.
Id. at 128.
10. Other commentators have rejected the majority view which denies jury trials in
Title VII cases. See Note, Jury Trial Right Under Title VII The Need for Judicial
Reinterpretation, 6 CARDOzO L. REv. 613 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Jury Trial]; Case
Comment, Right to Jury Trial in Suits for Back Pay: Title VII or Section 1981?, 12
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In Beesley v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company,1 the District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama broke ranks with the rest of the
federal judiciary, granting a jury trial to a sex-discrimination plaintiff
in a suit for back pay 2 and reinstatement under Title VII. The court
stated that the seminal cases on point rested largely on a conceptually
flawed determination that back pay constitutes a species of equitable
relief. 3 Furthermore, Judge Acker indicated that recent Supreme
Court decisions seriously undermine the majority view. 4 Lastly, the
court held that changed historical conditions 5 militate in favor of
abandoning, once and for all, the "self-perpetuating myth" that Title
VII precludes trial by jury. 6
This Note concludes that Beesley was correctly decided. Part I re-
views the history of Title VII and discusses early cases denying jury
trials. Part II provides an overview of traditional seventh amendment
analysis. Part III argues that traditional remedial doctrines and recent
refinements in seventh amendment methodology by the Supreme Court
require courts to grant a jury trial, upon request of either party, when a
plaintiff seeks to recover back pay under Title VII. 7 Part IV proposes
MEMP. ST. U.L. Rnv. 355 (1982). But see Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 167 (1969); Note, Congressional
Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973).
11. 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1989), afid on reconsideration, 723 F. Supp. 635
(N.D. Ala. 1989).
12. Back pay in this Note refers to wages that the court presumes an employee
would have earned but for the discriminatory termination.
13. Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 646. See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text
discussing nature of back pay claim.
14. Id. See infra notes 114-56 and accompanying text discussing cases undermining
the majority view; see also notes 171-83 discussing the Beesley court's reasoning.
15. See infra note 199 describing changed conditions in the South. The first Beesley
opinion detailed profound social changes that took place within the Northern District
of Alabama since 1964. Beesley 717 F. Supp. at 782. Upon rehearing of the jury issue,
Judge Acker evidently felt that his judgment rested solidly on the law, and omitted any
policy-based justifications for allowing jury trials.
16. Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 643.
17. This Note's construction of Title VII colors the reading of many other federal
statutes by implication. See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation
Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1407 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) ("[Title VI remedies,] like those
under Title VH, are essentially equitable in nature, and the 'procedures' available do not
include juries"). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act bans discrimination by entities receiv-
ing federal assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-d-6 (1988). Title VI, in turn, influences hand-
icap discrimination cases under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, section 504 of which
adopts "the remedies, procedures and rights set forth in Title VI." 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a)(a)(2) (1980). See Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 649 F. Supp. 35, 38 (S.D.
1991]
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a test to resolve seventh amendment problems that require complicated
remedies analyses. Coming full circle, Part VI revisits Beesley v. The
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. and discusses its progeny.
I. TITLE VII: FROM ENACTMENT TO JUDICIAL
(RE)CONSTRUCTION
A. Legislative History
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressed a wide range of evils associ-
ated with race discrimination in America."8 Title VII of the Act
sought to improve the deplorable economic state of blacks, attributed
to widespread discrimination practiced by private employers.' 9 En-
Fla. 1986) (limiting relief to back pay, reinstatement and attorney's fees). But see Nel-
son v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (damages recoverable), aff'd, 732
F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984). Compare also the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA) which bans discrimination against the elderly. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988). See Polstorffv. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Ala. 1977) ("It is untena-
ble that an action for reinstatement and lost earnings on account of unlawful discrimi-
nation should be equitable under Title VII, but legal under the ADEA."). The ripples
of Title VII jurisprudence also reach statutes as diverse as the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1980). See Kross v. Western
Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Title VII case law denying jury trial).
Title VII similarly influences how courts read and apply state civil rights acts. See
Olin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 798 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (Massachusetts case
relying on Title VII precedent to strike demand for jury); Continental Title Co. v. Dis-
trict Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1317-18 (Colo. 1982) (same); Brunecz v. Froudaille Indus.,
Inc., 13 Ohio App. 3d 106, 468 N.E.2d 370 (1983) (relief under Ohio statute is equitable
in nature; therefore, there is no right to a jury trial). But see Reiner v. New Jersey, 732
F. Supp. 530, 531-33 (D.NJ. 1990) (finding a right to jury trial under New Jersey fair
employment practices law).
18. See, e.g., Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1977) (voting rights); Title II, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988) (prohibits discrimination or segregation in public
places); Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1988) (prohibits discrimination in
programs receiving federal funds).
19. During Senate consideration of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Case noted that
the unemployment rate for non-whites was more than double that of whites. 110 CONG.
REc. 7241 (1964) (statement of Sen. Case). He described the dilemma as follows: "Of
course, discriminatory hiring practices are not in themselves the whole explanation for
the deprivation of the Negro. The Negro American is short-changed all along the line."
Id. Courts agree on the basic purpose of Title VII, and express it either with reference
to the problem or the solution. In one view, the enactors of Title VII sought to "battle
the plight of the Negro in our economy.'" Ende v. Board of Regents, 565 F. Supp. 501,
507 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber 443 U.S. 192, 202
(1979)). In the other view, the goal was to "make whole" victims of employment dis-
crimination. Darnell v. City of Jasper, 730 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1984). The latter
version betrays the view that Title VII only provides equitable relief. Courts under-
stand a "make whole" remedy to mean an equitable restoration of the status quo. See
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acted under Congress' Article I power to regulate interstate com-
merce,2" Title VII forbade discriminatory employment practices by
employers with more than fifteen employees and after 1972, by govern-
ment agencies.21 Upon a complainant's exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Title VII allows for private actions against allegedly discrim-
inatory employers.22 Relief consists of reinstatement, with or without
back pay.2 3 Courts rarely award compensatory and punitive damages
Firefighter's Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 612 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Leach v. Pan Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 288 (11th Cir. 1988).
20. See MEMORANDUM ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGALITY OF H.R.
7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1528 (1964). Congress similarly grounded Title II
of the Civil Rights Act on the commerce clause. Title II bans discrimination in places
of public accommodation. Id. By passing over the more appropriate fourteenth amend-
ment, section 5 of which authorizes Congress to pass legislation protecting the civil
rights of Americans, Congress evidently sought to insulate the Act from hostile judicial
challenges premised on the theory that the fourteenth amendment does not reach pri-
vate actions. See Letter from Gerald Gunther to the Department of Justice (June 5,
1963), reprinted in G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 158 (11th ed. 1985) (arguing
for the constitutionality of Title II under the fourteenth amendment).
21. Title VII prohibits discriminatory hiring, dismissal or promotion as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1980). Title VII also covers actions of trade unions. In 1972,
Congress extended Title VII to cover "governments, government agencies, [and] polit-
ical subdivisions." Id. § 2000e(a). Unlike the rest of Title VII, Congress grounded
these amendments on the fourteenth amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976) (extension Feld to be constitutional).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1980). Within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory
act, the employee must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC), established separately under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(e). The Com-
mission next notifies the employer and initiates its investigation. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If
the EEOC declines to issue a complaint, it mails out a "right to sue" letter, releasing the
employee to institute a private action. Id. On claims found meritorious, the EEOC
must first try to reach voluntary settlement with the employer, and, failing that, may
sue on the employee's behalf in federal district court. Id See generally B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1983 & Supp. 1983-88).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1980). The remedial section of Title VII provides as
follows:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
1991]
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under Title VII.2 4
The text of Title VII and congressional debates leading to its passage
leave open the issue of jury availability.25 Some portions of the legisla-
tive history certainly suggest an intent to deny the right to jury.26
Id. Title VII limits the back pay period to two years, and subtracts interim earnings.
Id.
In fashioning equitable relief, courts sometimes award compensation for the antici-
pated loss of future earnings, known as "front pay." See, e.g., Waldorf v. Board of
Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1988) (back pay, front pay and attorney's fees
awarded). Front pay awards are appropriate where reinstatement is not possible, as
where the employer "has exhibited such extreme hostility that, as a practical matter, a
productive and amicable working relationship would be impossible." EEOC v. Pruden-
tial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984) (age discrimination
case), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985). But see Foit v. Suburban
Bancorp., 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md. 1982) (no front pay because earning potential
too speculative for age discrimination victim).
Title VII courts classify front pay awards as a form of "other equitable relief." But
see Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins Co., 723 F. Supp. 635, 647 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (it is "just
as unrealistic and disingenuous" to label front pay equitable, as it is to label back pay
equitable).
24. See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir.
1981) (neither compensatory nor punitive damages are available under Title VII);
DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st Cir. 1980) (same).
25. See supra note 21 discussing the Title VII remedies provision. While it has
never passed on jury trials under Title VII, the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974) compared Title VII to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1977). The Curtis Court started with Title VIII's legislative his-
tory, finding it opaque on the right to jury trial. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 191-92. The Court
did cite evidence that Congress feared that juries would undermine Title VIII's goals.
Il Justice Marshall held that because Title VIII specifically furnished "appropriate
legal and equitable relief," Title VIII also created the right to a jury trial for actions at
law. Id. at 197. Title VII, in contrast, provided only equitable relief by direct reference.
Id
26. See 88 CONG. REc. 7214 (1964) (joint statement of Sen. Clark and Sen Case).
The senators stated that "The suit would ordinarily be heard by the judge sitting with-
out a jury in accordance with the customary practices for suits for injunctive relief."
(emphasis added) Id. The following exchange in the Senate also contains a modicum of
vagueness:
Mr. Ervin: Under Title VII, an order can be entered ordering a man to pay back
wages to a person who had never done a day's work for him.... Title VII contains
no requirement for a jury trial under any circumstances? Mr. Case: So far as the
act itself is concerned, there is no provision for jury trial. Of course, whether ajury
trial would be required would depend upon the Supreme Court in developing its
decision of the day before yesterday in [United States v.] Barnett [376 U.S. 681
(1964)]. A jury trial might be provided if the penalty were heavy enough. Mr.
Ervin: No jury trial is provided. Mr. Case: No jury trial is provided under the
terms of this section.
88 CONG. REc. 7255 (1964). Senator Case differentiated between "provide" and "re-
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However, the statute itself is silent on the availability of juries. One
author finds Title VII's legislative history equivocal and inconclusive. 27
Others maintain that Congress consciously rejected jury trials for en-
forcement proceedings.28 As discussed below, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that congressional intent does not dispose of the seventh
amendment issue.
29
B. Judicial Activism and Racially Biased Juries
The first courts to adjudicate the federal anti-discrimination laws30
quire," without saying "prohibit," thus leaving room for judicial definition of the vague
remedies provision. Senator Case also improperly invoked Barnett, a case inapposite to
Senator Ervin's concern. Barnett involved a civil action for contempt, not relevant to
private suits for back pay. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 683 (1964).
27. See Note, Jury Trial, supra note 10, at 632. As a preliminary matter, the author
notes that the drafters of the Civil Rights Act purposely obscured its procedural lan-
guage in order to minimize controversy and assure its passage. Ia at 622 n.50. On
Title VII, the Senate significantly rejected a proposal for masters to determine questions
of fact raised by pleadings, which would have foreclosed jury hearing. Id at 634 n.106.
Congress also opted against administrative enforcement, thereby putting Title VII
within the compass of the seventh amendment. Id. at 638.
28. See Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 167 (1969). First, Congress modeled Title VII on section
10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), knowing the latter forecloses jury
trials. Id. at 170. Second, Congress separately provided for jury trials in criminal con-
tempt cases under Title VII, but made no mention of juries in the remedies section. Id
Finally, Title VII empowers the "court," meaning judge, to order affirmative action.
Id.
None of the above reasons withstands close scrutiny. First, Congress was fully aware
of how the NLRA forecloses jury trials, namely because administrative boards (and not
courts, as with Title VII) adjudicate these cases. See infra notes 44, 149 explaining that
the seventh amendment only applies to federal courts of general jurisdiction. Second,
the Supreme Court gives little weight to the expressio unis est exclusio alterius maxim
for seventh amendment purposes. See infra note 154 rejecting expressio unis argument.
Finally, the statutory term "court" includes juries as well as judges. See infra note 41
citing cases rejecting the narrow interpretation.
Better proof of an intent to deny the right to jury arises from the language of the
provision itself, giving enumerated remedies "and other equitable relief" (emphasis ad-
ded). See supra note 23 for text of the remedies language of Title VII. Under the
ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory construction, equitable relief would include back
pay. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 1975) (applied this
reasoning), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
29. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text discussing the relationship be-
tween congressional intent and the seventh amendment analysis.
30. Apart from Title VII, numerous cases arose under Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3603 (1988), which banned housing discrimination.
The 1960s also witnessed the rejuvenation of the forgotten post-Civil War Civil Rights
Acts. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (deprivation of rights enjoyed by
1991]
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undoubtedly sought to escape the problem of biased juries. Many early
actions arose in the South, where racial hostility and mostly-white
venires were commonplace.3 1 The following excerpt from a 1972 case
eloquently states the fears of at least part of the federal judiciary at that
time:
If a jury could be resorted to in actions brought under this statute,
the very evil the statute is designed to prevent would often be at-
tained. The person seeking to vindicate an unpopular right could
never succeed before a jury drawn from a populace mainly op-
posed to his views.32
Not surprisingly, defendants rather than plaintiffs petitioned for jury
trials in the vast majority of early cases.33 A simple solution lay in
denying the right to trial by jury.3 4
That the same courts customarily turned down petitions for jury tri-
als under statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981," 5 which contain no lan-
whites); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (discrimination by persons acting
"under the color of law").
31. Describing the situation in 1964, one southern judge recently noted that "the
jury wheel in the Northern District of Alabama did not accurately reflect the racial and
gender makeup of the district." Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 781, 782
(N.D. Ala. 1989). The Beesley court noted significant changes in the intervening years,
however, concluding that "Southern juries of 1989 look and act much differently than
did 1964's Southern juries." Id. at 782-83.
32. Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683, 684 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 case). See also Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49, 53 (S.D. Ga.
1969) (jury would "thwart the will of Congress and to an extent frustrate the purposes
of the legislation"). Justice Marshall also recognized the risk of prejudice, but warned
that it could not "overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amendment." Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974). He noted that judges counteract bias by directing
verdicts, granting judgments notwithstanding the verdict, or ordering retrials. Id.
33. Even a cursory glance at the Title VII case law shows that the situation has
completely reversed itself, with plaintiffs now seeking juries in most instances. Compare
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant
requested jury) with Wilson v. City of Aliceville, 779 F.2d 631 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (plaintiff
requested jury).
34. See supra note 6 citing early Title VII cases denying jury petitions.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which is the modern equivalent of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State or Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secur-
ity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
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guage purportedly limiting relief to reinstatement, 36 confirms the fear-
of-bias hypothesis. 37 To eliminate the threat of bigoted juries,38 these
judges simply transposed their Title VII reasoning onto § 1981 actions
before them.39
C. The Reasoning of the Courts
In applying the seventh amendment to the new statutory right of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1980).
Some Title VII plaintiffs have obtained jury trials by attaching pendent state law
contractual or tort claims. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAW 290 (Supp. 1983-1988) (varying degrees of success in appending state law
claims to Title VII action).
36. See infra note 48 and accompanying text explaining that the nature of remedies
largely determines the availability of a jury.
37. Courts that denied the right to jury trial under the post-Civil War Civil Rights
Acts include the following: Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324
(5th Cir. 1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 case), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Marr v. Rife,
363 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 case); Williams v. Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 163, 165 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 case).
Some courts later reversed their position, allowing jury trials in section 1981 cases for
back pay. See Setser v. Novack Invest. Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated in
part on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1064 (1981). The Setser court reached the anomalous result of granting a jury trial in
an action for back pay only, while denying the same under Title VII. See Comment,
Right To Jury Trial in Suits for Back Pay: Title VII or Section 1981?, 12 MEM. ST. U.L.
REv. 355 (1982) (pointing out this discrepancy).
Unlike Title VII, section 1981 does not limit damages to back pay. When Title VII
plaintiffs with pendent section 1981 claims formerly sought damages beyond back pay,
the defendant could request a jury to hear issues common to the legal and equitable
claims. Later, plaintiffs obtained juries by this means. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,
881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (jury findings on section 1981 claim binding on court
deciding Title VII claim); Stephan v. PGA Sheraton Resort, Ltd., 873 F.2d 276 (1lth
Cir. 1989) (same); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988) (same, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
The Supreme Court effectively blocked this "end run" around Title VII in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), a 5-to-4 decision restricting section
1981 to suits where the victim has not yet been hired. Justice Kennedy based the major-
ity's decision on a literal reading of section 1981, which by its terms applies to the right
to "make and enforce contracts." See infra notes 180-81 discussing Patterson. Recently
vetoed legislation would have restored the right to maintain an action under section
1981 for discrimination throughout the period of employment. See supra note 4.
38. Some congressmen similarly feared that biased juries would sabotage the exten-
sive provisions of the Civil Rights Act. This explains, in part, why much of the Act is
enforced via injunction. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 191-92 (1974) (mentioning
congressional fear of biased juries under Title VII).
39. See supra note 17 citing cases that rely on Title VII methodology in order to
resolve seventh amendment problems.
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action, the courts focused on the literal language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2, which sets forth the remedies available in Title VII actions." First,
the courts noted that Title VII explicitly empowers courts to fashion
equitable remedies, but makes no mention of legal relief.41 Equally im-
portant was the relationship between back pay and the grant of equita-
ble powers. The courts described back pay as "intertwined" with or
"incidental" to reinstatement, effectively subordinating the former
remedy to the latter.42 Lastly, some courts noted that Title VII makes
back pay awards discretionary, hence requiring exclusive judicial
administration.43
40. See supra note 23 discussing Title VII remedies. Some courts resolved the sev-
enth amendment issue with reference to remedies only, avoiding the requisite historical
analysis. In Marr v. Rife, 363 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (S.D. Ohio 1973), the court stated
that "we do not find it necessary to search out common law analogues to the cause of
action... because courts have generally construed Section 1982 and similar civil rights
provisions to provide broad equitable relief... ." But see infra note 47 and accompany-
ing text discussing the three-part seventh amendment test for determining the right to a
jury trial.
41. Since Title VII provides that "courts" dispense relief, the argument follows that
Congress established equity jurisdiction. The more enlightened view rejects the generic,
statutory term "court" used in this way. See Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F.
Supp. 635, 639 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (citing cases rejecting a restrictive reading of Title
VII).
Unlike Title VII, some civil rights laws expressly provide for legal and equitable re-
lief. Significantly, many courts rejected the right to jury trial under Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 until the Supreme Court held in Curtis v. Loether, that courts
must grant the right to jury in actions for damages under that title.
42. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969), the court held back pay to be an "integral part of the statutory equitable remedy"
of reinstatement. In a suit for damages under section 1982 and injunction under Title
VIII, another court refused the defendant's request for a jury, holding that the "inciden-
tal money damages" were needed to effectuate equitable relief. Marr v. Rife, 363 F.
Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ohio 1973). See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text criticizing
this reasoning.
43. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (N.D. Ga.
1969) (noting that back pay is optional and therefore equitable), rev'd on other grounds,
421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975), however, limited lower courts' discretion to deny back pay for
violations of Title VII. The Court pointed out that Congress modeled the remedies
language on that in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1980),
under which courts award back pay "as a matter of course." Moody, 422 U.S. at 419-
20. Noting the "make whole" nature of Title VII remedies, the Court concluded,
"backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frus-
trate the central statutory purposes" of ending discrimination and compensating vic-
tims. Id. at 421. See also Sellers v. Delgado Community College, 839 F.2d 1132, 1136
(5th Cir. 1988) (noting that back pay will only be denied in "exceedingly rare"
circumstances).
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II. SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE: AN OVERVIEW
The seventh amendment secures the right to a trial by jury in federal
courts' where the controversy is legal in nature.45 The Supreme
Court in Bernhard v. Ross4 6 restates modem seventh amendment anal-
ysis as a three-part test, requiring courts to look at: (1) the historical
nature of the action, (2) the nature of the remedies involved and (3) the
relative capacity for juries to comprehend the issues.47 The Supreme
Court considers remedies analysis to be the most important part of the
test.
48
Historical analysis requires that courts compare the action to actions
at common law, and then find the best analogy.49 This often results in
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The seventh amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
Id.
45. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). Congress may avoid the
seventh amendment question by assigning rights of action to a non-article III forum,
such as an administrative tribunal or a special court of equity. See NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937) (seventh amendment does not apply to
NLRB hearings). Congress may make such an assignment only where the controversy
involves "public rights." See infra note 149 discussing public rights in seventh amend-
ment analysis.
46. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
47. Id. at 538 n.10. Bernhard states the test as follows: "As our cases indicate, the
'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with
reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities
of juries." Id. The third prong has received only occasional attention by the courts.
See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987) (noting that the Court has not
used jury capacity "as an independent basis for extending the right to jury trial"). Also,
federal courts have access to special devices for handling complex technical issues, such
as court-appointed masters and experts. See FED. R. CV. P. 53.
48. See Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1345 (1990) (stating
that the remedy sought is more important than the issues involved in determining
whether an action will resolve legal rights (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109
S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989)); Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18.
49. Where statutorily-based actions did not exist at common law, this prong of the
test requires the court to indulge its imagination by seeking out common law analogues.
The search need not yield an exact match. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 8, at 350 (1977) (courts "fit [the new remedy] into the nearest historical analogy
to determine whether there is a right to a jury trial"). Cases holding that the seventh
amendment does not apply to actions which did not exist in 1791 misread Bernhard's
learning. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (seventh amendment applies
to new, statutory actions).
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a stalemate because in 1791 courts of law and chancery exercised con-
current jurisdiction over many issues.5" Part two of the test seems per-
functory because remedies are easy to pigeonhole in the normal case.51
Where courts harbor doubt, they may defer to legislative guidance be-
cause cause-creating statutes often list available remedies or describe
the relief as being legal or equitable.52 The Constitution, however,
places limits on Congress' ability to restrict the right to jury trial.53 In
addition, the Supreme Court directs federal courts to "liberally con-
stru[e]" statutes in order to preserve the right to a jury trial.54
50. "The borrowing by each jurisdiction from the other was not accompanied by an
equivalent sloughing off of functions. This led to a very large overlap between law and
equity." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 49, at 354.
51. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 70 (1973) ("In a large number of cases this is a very
simple operation and hardly subject to any dispute."). See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962) ("Petitioner's contention ... is that insofar as the
complaint requests a money judgment it presents a claim which is unquestionably legal.
We agree with that contention.").
52. Title VIII, for instance, allows courts to "grant as relief, as it deems appropri-
ate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other or-
der, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $ 1000 punitive
damages.... 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1988). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) goes one step further, affirmatively stating that jury trials are available:
In an action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a trial by
jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a
result of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party
in such action.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)(1985). The Civil War era statutes are more cryptic in regard to
juries. See supra note 35 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
53. Where it provides for a judicial rather than administrative forum, Congress
"probably may not deprive the parties to the action of a right to jury trial." F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, supra note 49, at 349. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363,
383 (1974) (noting that Congress chose a court of general jurisdiction over an adminis-
trative forum); Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195 (same). Recent Supreme Court rulings have
gone further yet, impliedly diminishing the importance of legislative intent. See infra
notes 114-56 and accompanying text discussing recent cases. But see Note, Congres-
sional Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401
(1973) (for the proposition that Congress should be allowed to limit the right to a jury
trial where this would further justice).
54. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2794 (1989) (quoting
Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932)). Similarly, the rules of proce-
dure should be read to presumptively entitle jury trials to parties to federal statutory
actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38 ("[tlhe right to trial by jury as declared by the seventh
amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate.") (emphasis added).
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III. A NEw ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII UNDER THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT
A. The Historical Analogues
The seventh amendment analysis customarily commences with the
historical inquiry. Naturally, how one defines the action at hand deter-
mines where one will look in the common law. 5 Courts seeking ana-
logues to employment discrimination have not adequately addressed
the choice between civil rights and wrongful termination as separate
lines of investigation.5 6  Perhaps the summary nature of seventh
amendment analysis on this topic accounts for the dearth of study.57
At any rate, either route should end in the finding of an action at law.
Many commentators compare Title VII to suits for breach of im-
plied contract. 58 At common law, a wrongfully discharged employee
could treat the contract as continuing and recover putative wages, less
mitigation, in a court of law.59 To function, this approach must clear
55. Compare Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974) (comparing racial
discrimination in housing to both innkeepers' duty to provide shelter and dignitary
torts) with Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914, 917 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (framing
the issue of racial discrimination in employment as follows: "whether discharge of an
employee (for any legally wrongful reason) would support an action for recovery of
back pay tried to a jury at common law").
56. Title VII holds a central position in a comprehensive civil rights scheme. See
supra note 19 and accompanying text discussing congressional concern with economic
discrimination against blacks.
57. Courts today often view the remedies as patently equitable or read the act as
renouncing jury trials on its face. The court's conclusory discussion in Wilson v. City of
Aliceville, 779 F.2d 631, 635 (1lth Cir. 1986) typifies the prevailing judicial attitude:
"Since Title VII cases are entirely in equity there is no right to a jury trial, even when
the claimant seeks back pay." Id. See supra note 8 citing cases denying right to trial by
jury. This reasoning apparently obviates the historical inquiry. Recent Supreme Court
precedent, however, stresses the ongoing need to engage in historical analysis under the
seventh amendment. See infra notes 123-26, 151 and accompanying text discussing an
historical analysis under recent cases; cf infra note 166 discussing Justice Brennan's
criticism of an historical analysis test. No authorities today assert that one prong of the
test drops out because the other yields a clear answer.
58. See, eg., Ochoa, 338 F. Supp. at 917; Note, Jury Trial, supra note 10, at 629-31.
The Ochoa court identified two possible common law actions comparable to a Title VII
suit: indebitatus assumpsit and breach of contract by wrongful discharge. Ochoa, 338 F.
Supp. at 918-19.
59. Note, Jury Trial, supra note 10, at 629-30 n.85. The willingness of a discharged
employee to work was "equivalent to performance." Id. (quoting 11 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1358 (3d ed. 1968)).
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
148 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 39:135
the hurdle of the common law's presumption of employment at will."
In equity, recovery on wrongful discharge best corresponds to an ac-
tion for restitution.6
A second, relatively unexplored approach62 would treat Title VII as
a citizen's suit to recover on a civil rights63 violation. The common law
actions" most analogous to Title VII involve what have come to be
60. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937) (administra-
tive agency order of reinstatement with back pay was "unknown to the common law").
61. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text discussing restitution.
62. The rationale behind focusing on the contractual aspect of Title VII may stem
from the Supreme Court's notice that "the fact that the subject matter of a modem
statutory action and an 18th-century English action are close equivalents 'is irrelevant
for Seventh Amendment purposes,' because 'that Amendment requires trial by jury in
actions unheard of at common law'." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987)
(quoting Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974)) (emphasis added). How-
ever, the civil rights alternative does more than compare subject matter. The old and
new actions compared herein sound essentially in tort. See infra notes 65-72 and ac-
companying text analogizing Title VII claims to constitutional torts.
63. In his treatise on claims in equity, Professor DeFuniak defined civil rights as
rights with respect to other members of civil society, as distinguished from political
rights, which exist in relation to government. W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
EQUTrrY 140 (1956).
The philosophy of modem civil rights developed relatively late in comparison to the
common law. According to Kenneth Minogue, the concept of human rights "is as mod-
em as the internal combustion engine, and from one point of view, it is no less a techno-
logical device for achieving a common human purpose." Minogue, The History of the
Idea of Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 3 (W. Laqueuer & B. Rubin
eds. 1979). Minogue traces the modern phenomenon from John Locke's cautious de-
fense of property interests through its revolutionary triumph in America and France,
where it became enshrined in statements of "universal significance." In the nineteenth
century, civil rights parted ways with universal reason, reemerging as national rights
and minority rights.
In contrast to Minogue's view of rights as vast organizing principles, Maurice Cran-
ston defines rights from the positive law tradition as things "someone actually has," or
things enforceable in courts of law. Cranston, What Are Human Rights?, in HUM. Rrs.
READER, supra, at 17. The English Bill of Rights, and especially the United States
Constitution, "translate[d] moral rights into positive rights by making them enforceable
in American positive law." Id. at 23.
64. Although certain rights arose legislatively by Parliamentary decree, these never
encompassed "civil rights" as understood today. See Z. CHAFE, THREE HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 (1956) (tracing the origins of freedom of debate
in Congress and the prohibition of bills of attainder and freedom of movement, starting
from English statutory and common law). Class or nationality-based rights circulated
as slogans, without legal affect, in the radical writings of Tom Paine and the myth of the
"rights of freeborn Englishman" which were embraced by spontaneous revolutionary
movements during the early industrial revolution. See generally E.P. THOMPSON, THE
MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1963).
In America, what may be termed proto-civil rights actions arose at common law
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known as "constitutional torts."65
The first cases to combine tort with civil rights principles involved
voting rights.66 In Swafford v. Templeton,67 the Supreme Court re-
versed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in a suit brought to recover
damages for deprivation of a citizen's right to vote in national elec-
tions.68 Speaking for the Court, Justice White stated that "the right
which it was claimed had been unlawfully invaded was one in the very
nature of things arising under the Constitution and the laws of the
United States".69 While the plaintiff asserted his claim directly under
before and after the War for Independence. See W. NELSON, THE AMERICANIZATION
OF THE COMMON LAW (1975). Prior to the abolition of slavery in Massachusetts,
slaves in that state brought civil actions against their masters in order to secure their
freedom, on the ground that slavery violated the laws of man and nature. These cases,
dating from the 1760s, arose at law and were tried by juries. Id. at 101-02. Similarly,
religious dissenters at this time filed actions for damages against tax collectors of the
establishment, Congregationalist church. Id. at 107-08.
65. The term "constitutional tort," coined by Professor Shapo, describes the type of
quasi-tort, quasi-constitutional cases that arose in the early 1960s under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1980). See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape
and Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965). Professor Shapo warned that Monroe v.
Pape, which resuscitated the long-dormant section 1983 action, threatened to engulf all
policemen's torts against blacks as civil rights violations. Shapo urged that courts shed
the constitutional pretense and apply traditional tort principals. Shapo further asserted
that voting rights cases, like Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), prefigured modem
constitutional torts. Shapo, supra, at 282-83. In Nixon, Justice Holmes held that a
black man could recover damages under the fourteenth amendment against election
officials who enforced a Texas law barring blacks from voting in Democratic primaries.
Nixon, 273 U.S. at 541.
66. See Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58
(1900). See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text discussing these cases.
Using post-1791 case law for seventh amendment analysis creates a problem, given
that the Court only authorizes use of pre-1791 cases. This rule should be modified in
appropriate instances, such as where American law fundamentally departs from English
laws. Nowhere is this more the case than with the nations' respective Constitutions.
The English Constitution consists of the uncollected decisions of the judiciary. See gen-
eraIly J. MACY, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION (1897), reprinted by Fred B. Rothman &
Co. (1988). The American Constitution, by contrast, is a written document enumerat-
ing, in greater or lesser detail, specific rights and liberties.
In practice, some courts resort to newer precedent for their seventh amendment anal-
yses, discussing federal cases prior to the merger of law and equity in 1932. See, e.g.,
Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 673 F. Supp. 117, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (suit under con-
sideration "has no historical parallel prior to the merger of courts of law and of
equity").
67. 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
68. Id. at 494. The plaintiff sued state election officials, who apparently did not
raise the defense of constructive sovereign immunity. Id. at 491.
69. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). The Court relied on a criminal case, Ex parte
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the Constitution,7 ° the Court had no occasion to question that docu-
ment as a source of civil liability. By clear implication, this constitu-
tionally-derived tort arose at law.71
Similar to Constitutional torts, scholars have identified common law
actions protective of "privacy and personhood."72 Assuming that civil
rights encompass a species of the right to be "let alone"7" or the right
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 655, 664 (1884), which involved a conspiracy to deprive a citizen
of his vote, for the notion that the right to vote for a member of Congress is "fundamen-
tally based upon the Constitution." Swafford, 185 U.S. at 492.
70. By contrast, the plaintiff in Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900), argued his case
under the Constitution and under a federal law imposing civil liability on persons who
deprived a citizen of his right to vote. For analogical purposes, a private action under
Title VII represents a breach of fourteenth amendment "values," despite the statute's
foundation in the commerce clause. See supra note 20 arguing that Congress based
Title VII on the commerce clause in order to avoid judicial challenges premised on the
theory that the fourteenth amendment does not reach private actions.
The analogy is inexact also in that no private action may arise from a private person's
violation of another's fourteenth amendment rights. See Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("rights secured by
the fourteenth amendment are rights to protections against unfair or unequal treatment
by the State, not by private parties"); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional). Comparisons, however, need not be
exact in seventh amendment analysis. See supra note 49 and accompanying text argu-
ing that courts make analogies rather than search for exact equivalents at common law.
Hence, the civil rights violation and tort nexus suffices for present purposes. See supra
note 64 discussing proto-civil rights torts at common law.
The post-1791 development of constitutional torts is also a non-problem, and simi-
larly disappears. The analogy shifts from ancient common law tort liability to modem,
civil rights tort law. See infra note 72 and accompanying text discussing common law
remedies to protect privacy and personhood.
71. In Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900), also involving the right to vote for a
member of Congress, the Court made reference to juries. Against the defendant's argu-
ment that the court would not allow plaintiff to recover the minimum amount in contro-
versy required for federal jurisdiction, the Court remarked that calculation of damages
"in such an action is peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury." Id. at 65.
The availability of a jury in Wiley indicates that the action arose at law. See supra notes
44-45 and accompanying text noting that jury trials are available for actions at law.
72. Professor Tribe notes that the common law contains "a potpourri of writs and
actions of varying vintage which bear on aspects of privacy and personlhood as currently
conceived." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1310 (2d ed. 1988). The
better-known examples include defamation, assault and battery and invasion of privacy.
Id. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974), Justice Marshall made a similar
comparison, stating that an action to redress racial discrimination "may also be likened
to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress." Id. The Curtis
Court did not engage in extended historical analysis because the statute in question
explicitly provided for recovery of damages. Id. at 196.
73. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) citing
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
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to be considered a complete member of society,74 a suit to vindicate
such a right might sound equally in equity or law, depending on the
remedy sought.7 5 This inquiry must wait until we consider the nature
of the remedy at issue, which comes next in the seventh amendment
analysis.76
B. The Nature of the Remedy
Title VII protects civil rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment,7 7 directing courts to use their full equitable powers78 to eliminate
employment discrimination. 79 Title VII also provides for back pay.8 0
right to privacy underlies the entire line of cases finding implied fundamental rights,
including the right to marry, procreate and choose to have an abortion.
74. The Declaration of Independence lays the conceptual basis for such a "right" in
its famous credo: "All men are created equal." See supra note 72 and accompanying
text discussing the rights of personhood.
75. For example, an invasion of privacy can represent a "constitutional tort," an
action which is at law. See supra note 65 discussing constitutional torts. The Supreme
Court recognizes a limited constitutional right to privacy via implied fundamental
rights that arise under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding the right to read obscene materials
in one's home). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (rejecting the
claim for a constitutional right "for homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sod-
omy"). In modem equity, the right to privacy exists as the right to "publicity," vi
reaping benefits from the commercialization of one's name. Where appropriate, courts
will also enjoin actual or threatened invasions not necessarily arising from publication.
See W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 63, at 133-34.
76. Necessarily, the remedy and the action-at-law-versus-equity analyses intersect
where one term must be used to define the other.
77. As a practical exigency, Congress enacted Title VII pursuant to the commerce
clause. See supra note 23 discussing the reasons for choosing the commerce clause.
Other civil rights laws derived their authority directly from the fourteenth amendment,
notably the post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983
(1980).
78. Even before Congress enacted Title VII, courts had largely abandoned the com-
mon law rule limiting equity to the protection of property rights. See generally W.
DEFUNIAK, supra note 63. at 70-74, 122-52. According to DeFuniak, when equity de-
veloped and emerged, "rights of property rather than human rights were paramount."
Id. at 10. At common law today, personal rights protectable in equity include civil
rights and the right to privacy. Id. at 140. The right to privacy is, simply put, the right
to be left alone. Id. at 129. See generally Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
79. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) ("Congress' pur-
pose in investing a variety of 'discretionary' powers in the courts was not to limit appel-
late review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make
possible the 'fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible' ").
80. See supra note 23 for text of remedies section of Title VII.
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Given that federal courts may enjoin civil rights violations under Title
VII, and that Title VII also allows monetary recovery, the classifica-
tion issue at hand requires defining the nature of what appears to be a
legal remedy within an equitable scheme of relief.
1. Back Pay As Restitution?
Of the equitable remedies, ordering payment of back wages most
nearly resembles equitable restitution."1 Most definitions of restitu-
tion82 require wrongful gains, in addition to injury in fact.8" Employ-
ers who discriminate on the basis of race usually do so out of bigotry
81. See, eg., Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 1972) (back pay
regarded as "an appropriate exercise of a chancellor's power to require restitution"),
aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Bittner v. Sadoff& Rudoy Ind.,
490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (ERISA case, citing Rogers v. Loether). The
Supreme Court also recognized, without expressly endorsing, this view in dicta. See
Curtis, 418 U.S. at 197 (noting that courts consider back pay as a "form of restitution").
Other courts interpret back pay as equitable, without defining it as restitution. See
Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 1982) (back pay is "either
equitable [or] legal relief incidental to an equitable cause of action"); Robinson v. Loril-
lard, 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971) ("The back pay award is not punitive in nature
but equitable - intended to restore the recipients to their rightful economic status.").
82. Black's Law Dictionary defines restitution as follows:
Act of restoring; restoration; restoration of anything to its rightful owner; the act of
making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or injury; and indemnifica-
tion. Restoration of status quo and [sic] is amount which would put plaintiff in as
good a position as he would have been if no contract had been made and restores to
plaintiff value of what he parted with in performing contract.... In torts, restitu-
tion is essentially the measure of damages, while in contracts a person aggravated
by a breach is entitled to be placed in the position in which he would have been if
the defendant had not breached.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 682 (abridged 5th ed. 1983).
83. Courts award restitution "only in order to deprive the defendant of an enrich-
ment obtained at the plaintiff's expense." G. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITuTION 1, 133
(1978). The notable exception arises from a breach of fiduciary duty involving parties.
Id. The authors of the proposed Restatement (Second) of Restitution, defined the "gen-
eral principle" of unjust enrichment as follows, "A person who receives a benefit by
reason of an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other
owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrich-
ment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § I (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983). See
also P. BIRKS, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1985) 313 ("[Plaintiff's]
prima facie title to restitution rests on the statement that the defendant has enriched
himself by committing a wrong against him."); Professor Moore, stating that "restitu-
tion is usually thought of as a remedy by which defendant is made to disgorge illgotten
gains or to restore to status quo, or both." 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.24[2],
at 206 (1988) (emphasis added).
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rather than economic interest.84 Indeed, large companies know all too
well the risks that attend employment discrimination.s
The authorities on restitution do not consider back pay awards as a
proper subject of restitution.86 Professor Dobbs expressly defines back
pay as a legal remedy. 7 Although he never mentions back pay in his
treatise, Professor Palmer gives two examples of restitution where, as
with Title VII, the victorious plaintiff obtains a benefit which he or she
did not previously have. These examples warrant separate
consideration.
In the first case, a third party wrongly receives a benefit owed to the
plaintiff."8 Here, justice requires restitution to the deprived party. In
the typical employment situation, however, white third party benefi-
ciaries will not be liable for their employer's wrongful deeds.89 More
84. However, some employers might genuinely wish to disadvantage non-majority
employees in order to increase efficiency by reducing inter-employee discord. See
Baker, A Voluntary Approach to Equal Opportunity, in THE NEGRO AND EQUAL EM-
PLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 115 (H. Northrup & R. Rowan eds. 1965) (discussing a
strike in the early 1960s by 200 International Harvester employees over the promotion
of a black welder). The armed forces currently employ this reasoning in order to ex-
clude admitted homosexuals from their ranks. See Woodward v. United States, 871
F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Ben-Shalom v. Secre-
tary of the Army, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
85. Employment discrimination suits are extremely costly to defend. See Affirma-
tive Action Here To Stay Despite "Stotts," Conference Told, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 429 (Mar. 25, 1985) (up to $75,000 for a "simple" case; hundreds of thousands
of dollars for a complex one); see also Fisher, Businessmen Like to Hire By the Numbers,
FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 26 ("[p]ersuasive evidence indicates that most large corpo-
rations want to retain their affirmative action programs, numerical goals and all").
86. In his chapter on "Torts or Equitable Wrong," Professor Palmer identifies the
subjects for restitution as conversion; trespass to land; interference with contract rela-
tions; patent infringement; appropriation of intellectual property; interference with per-
sonalty; enrichment at plaintiff's expense and fiduciary impropriety (e.g., insider
trading). G. PALMER, supra note 83, at 121. The Restatement of Restitution is simi-
larly devoid of any reference to back wages for wrongful termination.
87. D. Dons, supra note 51, at 69 n.18 (1973). Criticizing the rationale from Har-
kless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), which held that
"intertwined" claims for back pay and restitution under Title VII amount to a single
equitable remedy, Professor Dobbs stated, "[I]n no way does the money claim seem
'equitable.' It is precisely the claim available as damages to any wrongfully discharged
employee." D. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 69 n.18.
88. G. PALMER, supra note 83, at 4.
89. Some whites benefit indirectly from employer discrimination. See, e.g., Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485 (1980) ("some non-minority businesses may have
reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms
from [government] contracting opportunities"). Title VII, however, does not create co-
employee liability. See supra note 21 quoting Title VII.
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relevant might be the second situation, where the defendant has re-
ceived no benefit:
90
The cancellation of an anticipated gain also is included where the
successful party avoids liability on an unperformed obligation on
the basis of fraud, duress, or mistake. The principles underlying
relief are much the same whether the gain under the contract has
been realized or is only prospective.91
Adapting Palmer's example to the Title VII scenario, the "anticipated
gain" would be expected profits from a discriminatory workplace, the
"successful party" would be an employee who recovers expected wages
rather than "avoiding liability," and "fraud" would correspond to a
prohibited practice under Title VII. The linguistic contortions re-
quired to fit a Title VII action into Professor Palmer's framework ob-
scure the ratio decidendi for recovery in either case. While the Palmer
example entails equitable avoidance of contractual obligation, Title VII
involves direct recovery on a "contract," assumed for seventh amend-
ment purposes.92 The positive recovery of anticipated wages operates
differently than the double negative of avoiding liability, resulting in
restitution in the latter case only.
2. Back Pay as Legal Relief: The LMRA and ADEA Analogies
The federal judiciary's approach to back pay under different statu-
tory schemes might serve as a useful model for a new seventh amend-
ment analysis of Title VII. Despite some differences,93 employee
actions under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
90. See supra note 85 and accompanying text explaining employers do not profit
from discriminatory employment practices when they are forced to defend costly dis-
crimination suits.
91. G. PALMER, supra note 83, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
92. Ordinarily, the Title VII plaintiff will not have been employed under a contract.
If formerly employed under a contract, however, the Title VII plaintiff might have a
pendent state law claim in breach of contract. A growing number of state courts also
permit actions for wrongful termination on public policy grounds. See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 298-99 (Supp. 1983-
88).
93. Title VII actions are contractual by analogy. Section 301 actions, on the other
hand, sound in contract. See Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
705 n.7 (section 301 is "essentially an action for damages" for breach of contract). Cf
infra note 96 arguing that bargaining agreements are not contracts per se. Section 301
and Title VII also differ with respect to parties. Employees suing employers under sec-
tion 301 must join unions as defendants in the majority of cases. See infra note 95
discussing actions between union and employer.
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1947 (LMRA) share much in common with Title VII suits.94 Both
statutes create private rights of action95 without common law
equivalents.96 Moreover, courts limit relief in both to back pay under
ordinary circumstances.97 Lastly, the text of neither statute refers to
jury trials, directly or indirectly.98 It is significant, therefore, that back
94. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). One must distinguish between section 301 actions and
actions under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Although both often result
in awards of back pay and reinstatement, courts hear the former, whereas the latter
arise under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
an administrative tribunal exempt from the seventh amendment. See NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937) (noting that there is no right to jury trial
for actions under the NLRA). Section 301 actions typically involve breaches of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, whereas NLRA actions concern unfair labor practices.
95. Section 301 allows unions and employers to sue one another in federal district
court for violating terms of their collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1980). Because most bargaining agreements contain extensive arbitration clauses, most
section 301 actions by individual employees alleging wrongful termination include
claims against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Without doing so,
the exclusivity clause would bar most suits. See infra note 103 citing hybrid section
301/fair representation suits. See generally R. GORmAN, LABOR LAW-BASIC TEXT
721-22 (1976). In most cases, though, "the bulk of the damages will be assessed against
the employer rather than the union, since the major harm to the employee is his sever-
ance from work." Id. at 723.
96. At common law prior to 1791, there was no right of action to redress civil rights
violations, in employment or elsewhere. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text
discussing the development of civil rights in the law and common law analogies to Title
VII. Likewise, the common law presumed employment-at-will unless the master and
servant bound one another contractually. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 48. Col-
lective agreements, however, were considered unenforceable "executory" contracts. See
C. GREGORY & H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 339 (1979) (bargaining agreements
were "illegitimate hybrids, with no proper name or significance, legally speaking").
Even under the NLRA, not all terms of the agreement create contractual rights between
the employer and the union. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (compar-
ing collective bargaining agreements to trade agreements and carriers' tariffs).
97. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text discussing remedies available
under Title VII. The typical section 301 action against employers sounds in contract,
governed by traditional rules limiting liability. See Elect. Workers, Local No. 12 v. A-1
Elect. Serv., Inc., 535 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1976) (damages to place employee in as good a
position as if no breach had occurred); Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 673 F. Supp. 117
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting a jury trial to plaintiff seeking back pay, reinstatement and
restoration of benefits). Although fair representation actions resemble torts, courts
rarely award punitive damages against unions. See International Brd. of Elect. Workers
v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1979) (denying recovery because punitive damages could
harm union's future ability to protect workers' rights). "Compensatory damages"
against unions usually consist of back pay. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459
U.S. 212, 227 n.16 (1983) (union's share of damages in hybrid action "normally will be
limited and finite").
98. See supra notes 23-24 discussing remedies available under Title VII.
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pay under section 301 constitutes damages rather than a form of resti-
tution, even when the plaintiff additionally seeks reinstatement or other
equitable relief.99 Although the Supreme Court recently distinguished
between legal and equitable forms of back pay, other language in the
same opinion problematizes the Court's conclusion. 
° °
The Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)'O° occu-
pies a middle position between Title VII and section 301, being a dis-
crimination statute"°2 and expressly providing for relief at law.
1 0 3
99. See Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190, 206 (3d Cir. 1977); Nicely v.
USX, 709 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (jury award of back pay); Woods v. Dunlop
Tire Corp., 673 F. Supp. 117 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (jury trial granted in suit for lost wages
and benefits, reinstatement and restoration of seniority rights). But see Leach v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 842 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1988) (no jury trial because legal and
equitable remedies of hybrid action are inseparable); King v. Fox Grocery Co., 678 F.
Supp. 1174 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (same, although conceding that back pay under section 301
is not so easily characterized as an equitable remedy).
In Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990), the Supreme Court
resolved the split in jurisdictions, holding that plaintiffs in hybrid section 301 and duty
of fair representation suits for back pay were entitled to a trial by jury. Although the
plaintiff sought back pay only (employer had gone out of business), the "intertwined"
equitable remedy of reinstatement would not have diminished his seventh amendment
right. Id. at 1348.
100. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1348-49. For purposes of differentiating types of back pay,
the Court assumed arguendo that no right to a jury trial exists under Title VII. Re-
sponding to the union's argument that, since back pay is equitable under Title VII, it
also must be so under section 301, Justice Marshall noted that Congress characterized
back pay as "equitable relief." Id. at 1348. Citing his own dicta in Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189 (1974), Justice Marshall continued that back pay recoverable under Title
VII would "generally be restitutionary in nature." Terry, 110 S. Ct. at 1349. Justice
Marshall's earlier finding regarding back pay under section 301, reproduced as follows,
flatly contradicts this latter depiction of the Title VII remedy as "restitutionary":
[W]e have characterized damages as equitable when they are restitutionary, such as
in "action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits" ..... The backpay sought by
respondents is not money wrongfully held by the Union, but wages and benefits they
would have received from [ex-employer] had the Union processed the employees'
grievances properly. Such relief is not restitutionary.
Id. at 1348 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Title VII plaintiffs identically seek
wages "they would have received," but for the employers' unlawful actions.
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1980).
102. See Polstorff v. Fletcher, 430 F. Supp. 592, 594 (N.D. Ala. 1977) ("The pur-
poses of Title VII and the ADEA, discouragement of discrimination in employment, are
substantially similar."); see also Note, Administrative Res Judicata and the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1111, 1123-25 (1989) (discussing simi-
larity between ADEA and Title VII).
103. The ADEA permits recovery of back pay and, in cases involving intentional
discrimination, additional "liquidated" damages equal to the back pay award. 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1980). Furthermore, the Act provides that "the court shall have juris-
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Under the ADEA, many courts allow juries to determine recovery of
back pay." 4 Because the ADEA and Title VII share the same basic
goals, reasons of policy (were they relevant to seventh amendment
analysis) cannot account for the incongruous division of labor regard-
ing who determines recovery. The methodologically troublesome con-
clusion must be that back pay is a chameleon-like remedy, whose
nature changes with the words surrounding it. Significantly, back pay
looks legal when placed beside the ADEA's provision for legal and
equitable relief.' 5
3. The Remedies: "Clean-Up" Doctrine or Equitable Co-Dependents?
For seventh amendment purposes, the Supreme Court cautions
against artificially isolating remedies from the context in which they
arise."°o Consequently one must look at back pay within Title VI's
remedial scheme and in context of the statute as a whole.
Interrelation of remedies is relevant insofar as the Supreme Court
recognizes that not all commands to pay constitute legal remedies.1
0 7
The issue may be stated as follows: Are the remedies conceptually au-
diction to grant such legal and equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter." Id.
104. The Supreme Court resolved a split in circuits on the availability of a jury trial
under the ADEA in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). Writing for an unanimous
Court, Justice Marshall held that although the ADEA contains no express provision for
a jury, Congress must have assumed its availability. This was so because Congress
adopted the remedies from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1988), which the courts have read to allow jury trials in suits for back wages. Loril-
lard, 434 U.S. at 582-83. Justice Marshall compared Title VII's provision for "equita-
ble" relief to the ADEA's provision for "legal or equitable relief." Id. at 584. Finally,
he noted that the ADEA provides that defendants "shall be liable for damages," as
opposed to Title VII's payment of back pay by means of "equitable discretion." Id.
Shortly after Lorilard, Congress amended the ADEA to reflect the Court's holding,
explicitly providing for jury trials in ADEA actions. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1980).
That Congress changed the ADEA, while leaving Title VII unmodified, may be ex-
plained by the fact that many Title VII plaintiffs at this time obtained juries by pleading
pendent claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or attaching state law counts. See supra note 35
discussing jury trials granted for combined section 1981 and Title VII cases.
105. Were back pay "by nature" truly equitable, juries would neither rule on, nor
calculate recovery.
106. See infra note 127 and accompanying text noting the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the false separation of remedy from cause in the historical segment of seventh
amendment analysis.
107. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (restitution is equitable, but
money award in housing discrimination constitutes damages). In the usual case, mone-
tary awards constitute relief at law. See Dairy Queen v. Wood, Inc., 369 U.S. 469
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tonomous, or are they so inextricably intertwined as to be separately
meaningless?08 If they stand alone, then the Court's repudiation of
the "clean-up" doctrine" requires naming back pay and reinstatement
as legal and equitable remedies respectively.11 0 If they constitute parts
of a single remedy, then courts assume both to be equitable. 11
The dictates of common sense favor separability, given that Title VII
plaintiffs may sue for either back pay or reinstatement, or both. 2 The
discrimination victim will not always wish to return to his or her for-
mer job, especially if a superior alternative avails itself before litigation.
The most logically sound view defines back pay as a limited form of
damages.' 
13
(1962) (suit for damages not converted to equitable claim by labeling underlying action
an "accounting").
108. The Supreme Court formerly tested the relation of remedies under the seventh
amendment by "ranking" their importance. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937), the Court stated that the seventh amendment "has no application
to cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable relief." The Court
in Bernhard v. Ross, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) effectively renounced this doctrine by consid-
ering claims separate from one another. More recently, the Court considered remedies
separately for this analysis. See infra notes 114-56 and accompanying text discussing
recent cases.
109. Under the equitable "clean-up doctrine," chancery courts historically assumed
discretionary jurisdiction over incidental legal claims. This obviated the need to go
through the duplicative and burdensome process of instituting a separate action in a
court of law. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 51, at 83-85. The Supreme Court
repudiated this theory in Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) and its
progeny, providing either party the right to jury on any legal claim in a suit for legal
and equitable relief under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id. at 508. See supra notes
46-51 and accompanying text discussing modem seventh amendment analysis.
110. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text discussing seventh amendment
analysis. The Court's rejection of the clean-up doctrine disposes of the claim that "inci-
dental" legal claims become equitable by their coincidence with greater equitable
claims. See supra note 42 discussing the reasoning employed in early Title VII cases.
111. One example might be where a chancellor enjoins a swindler from disseminat-
ing an untruthful advertisement, and orders restitution to his cheated victims. Other
familiar examples arise in the "traditionally equitable" fields of bankruptcy, trusts and
estates. But see infra note 149 and accompanying text indicating that a suit for damages
in bankruptcy can arise at law under some circumstances. Query, had Congress in Title
VII provided for "legal remedies, including back pay and reinstatement," who would
order the employer to rehire the unlawfully dismissed employee? Clearly, the legal na-
ture of one remedy would not permit jury determination of the injunctive measure,
notwithstanding that Congress affixed a descriptive label.
112. Indeed, the prevailing notion that back pay helps to implement reinstatement
and make plaintiffs "whole" poses an antinomy and begs a question irrelevant to sev-
enth amendment analysis, namely, which remedy "came first."
113. Legislatures or courts may limit recovery to back pay for policy reasons, much
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IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND JURY TRIALS
UNDER TrILE VII
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Tull v. United States... and
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg " 5 represent powerful statements in
defense of the seventh amendment right to jury trials.116 Taken to-
gether, the two cases suggest that either party to a Title VII action
would be entitled to a trial by jury, as of right, where the plaintiff seeks
to recover back pay.
In Tull v. United States,117 the United States sued a developer under
provisions of the Clean Water Act11 that ban the destruction of wet-
lands without a federal permit." 9 Denying defendant's petition for
jury trial, the district court found for the government, assessing civil
fines totaling $325,000 (of over $22 million sought), and ordered the
defendant to restore those ruined tracts still in its possession to their
pristine state. 2 ° On appeal of the decision to deny the right to a jury
trial, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the civil penalties were
subordinate to the equitable relief sought.1 21 The Supreme Court
as they set ceilings on civil fines or abolish punitive damages. See, e.g., Knierim v. Izzo,
22 ll1.2d 73, 88, 174 N.E.2d 157, 165 (1961) (holding that punitive damages are not
recoverable under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress). As for Title
VII, Congress may have felt that permitting compensatory and punitive damages would
deter plaintiffs from settling claims through conciliation, in hope of striking a litigation
bonanza. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2375 (1989)
("although there is some necessary overlap between Title VII and 1981, [the Court] is
reluctant to read an earlier statute broadly where the result is to circumvent the detailed
remedial scheme constructed in the later statute").
114. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
115. 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).
116. The Supreme Court recently decided a third case broadly endorsing the right
to trial by jury. See Chauffers, Local 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990). Terry in-
volved an employee's right to jury trial under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, where legal and equitable remedies are intertwined. See supra notes 99-
100 discussing Terry.
117. 615 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd
and remanded, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
118. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
119. The Clean Water Act prohibits unauthorized discharge of dredge or fill into
"navigable waters," which include wetlands. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344, 1362(7) (1988).
Section 1319 provides for injunctive relief and civil penalties not to exceed $10,000 per
day. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d) (1988).
120. Tull, 615 F. Supp. at 626-27 (1983).
121. 769 F.2d 182, 187 (1985). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit emphasized the
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granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits.122
Justice Brennan in his majority opinion began by reciting the famil-
iar rules of seventh amendment analysis, namely the historical and
remedies analyses.12 In the Court's view, the civil penalty suit
"clearly" corresponded to an action at law in debt.'24 Retreating,
however, the Court admitted that the analogies offered by both par-
ties125 were "appropriate" and turned to the remedies analysis.
1 26
In its remedies analysis, the Court decided first whether the relief
sought by the government was punitive (legal) or restorative (equita-
ble) in nature. Citing legislative purpose, Justice Brennan stated that
the civil fine provision sought to punish polluters and deter those who
would degrade wetlands. Therefore, the fine represented a penalty,
akin to punitive damages, which only a court of law could enforce at
common law.127 On the facts of the case, the Court easily rejected the
government's argument that the fines served to disgorge improper
discretionary nature of the assessment of penalties under section 1319 of the Clean
Water Act.
122. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
123. Id. at 417, 418. Citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), the
Court reemphasized that the remedies analysis is "'[m]ore important' than finding a
precisely analogous common law action." Tull, 481 U.S. at 421. The Court pointedly
rejected what it termed the government's attempt to divide the statute "into a cause of
action and a remedy, and analyz[e] each component as if the other were irrelevant." Id.
at 421 n.6. By this means, the government had sought to create an insurmountable
hurdle by separately finding the cause and remedy to be equitable.
124. Tull, 481 U.S. at 418. The Court ruled that the action was "clearly analogous
to the 18th-century action in debt, and federal courts have rightly assumed that the
Seventh Amendment required a jury trial." Id. at 420 (emphasis added). The govern-
ment had argued that the statutory action best comported with an action by the Sover-
eign to abate a public nuisance. Id.
125. The petitioner analogized the suit to an action in debt at common law. Id. at
418. The government, on the other hand, compared the suit to an equitable action to
abate a public nuisance. Id. at 420.
126. The Court here did not so much abandon the "best analogy" test for a stan-
dard of "irrefutable superiority" as reaffirm that courts must examine both prongs of
the Bernhard test, and not quit early if either yields a clear result. In so doing, Justice
Brennan in Tull tacitly reformulates the two-part analysis as a kind of balancing test.
Id. at 421. Justice Brennan articulated the test later in Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989), as follows:
If, on balance, these two factors indicate that a party is entitled to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment, we must decide whether Congress may assign and has
assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that
does not use a jury as a factfinder.
Id.
127. Tull, 481 U.S. at 422.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/5
RIGHT TO JURY UNDER TITLE VII
gains and, as such, constituted a form of restitution. 2 ' The Court also
rejected the government's contention that the legal remedy was "inter-
twined" with the equitable one.12 9
As a final issue, the Court questioned whether Congress could per-
missibly assign the computation of civil penalties to judges, consistent
with the seventh amendment. The Court held that it could as a matter
of policy, 30 recognizing that the grant would not detract from the
jury's ultimate authority.13 1 Justice Scalia's dissent in part, joined by
Justice Stewart, argued that the Court had not gone far enough to pro-
tect the seventh amendment right.13 2 Justice Scalia would have per-
mitted juries to assess fines as well.133
Tull bears relevance to the Title VII jury issue on several points.
First, the majority repudiated the argument that discretionary mone-
tary awards signify equitable relief.13 4 As a necessary corollary, the
Court overrode legislative intent to the degree in which Congress
sought to create equitable remedies by means of assigning computa-
tion. More than this, the Court rejected sub silentio the government's
argument from legislative history that Congress intended to create an
equitable remedy. 35 In doing so, the Court minimized legislative his-
128. Id. at 424. The multi-million dollar fine requested suggested to the Court that
the government was after more than illgotten gains. Id. at 423.
129. Id. In so holding, the Court noted that the district court emphasized the dis-
cretionary nature of the penalty assessment under section 1319 of the Clean Water Act.
Id. at 422 n.8. Moreover, the Court explained that the district court had fashioned a
"package of remedies" whose monetary and injunctive parts represented a logical
whole. 481 U.S. at 416 (quoting Tull v. United States, 769 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
1985).
Significantly to the Court, the defendant had sold most of the lands, and was at lib-
erty to restore only a fraction of the total area it had degraded. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
Justice Brennan's statement of the case raises the suspicion that the government in-
cluded equitable relief as a pretext to bar defendant's right to jury.
130. Id. at 426-27. Congress properly assigned highly difficult, discretionary fines
to the courts, given that it could have legislatively set the fines in the first instance. Id.
131. Id. As Justice Brennan put it, "a determination of a civil penalty is not an
essential function of a jury trial." Id. at 426.
132. Id. at 427, 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 422 n.7. Justice Brennan rejected the government's argument that a
discretionary penalty required judicial application. The Court stated: "The government
distinguishes this suit from other actions to collect a statutory penalty on the basis that
the statutory penalty here is notfixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula. We do
not find this distinction to be significant." Id. (emphasis added).
135. See Brief of the United States at 31, Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)
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tory as a guide to seventh amendment analysis, at least where the face
of the statute in question yields no easy answer.
1 36
Secondly, the Court refused to deny jury trials where the legal rem-
edy is arguably "incidental" to the equitable one.137 By the time of
Tull, one could fairly say that the incidental, ergo equitable, argument
had become a dead letter.138
(No. 85-1259). The government quoted statements of an alleged congressional intent to
limit relief to "disgorgement." According to Senator Muskie, the bill's sponsor:
the [EPA's] current enforcement policy is to seek court imposed penalties for non-
compliance with Clean Water Act requirements in amounts commensurate with
the economic benefit of delayed compliance, among other factors. This policy em-
bodies congressional intent on the criteria that should be considered by courts in
imposing civil penalties under existing provisions of the act.
123 CONG. REC. 39,190 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). The government's brief fo-
cused heavily on the discretionary nature of the relief, believing, with the dissent, that a
jury must not hear the underlying case if Congress required the court to calculate and
assess the penalties. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I can recall no
precedent for judgment of civil liability by jury but assessment of amount by the
court.")
136. Interestingly, Justice Brennan stated in a footnote that the Court would avoid
the constitutional question if it could resolve the issue through statutory construction.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 n.3 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), which had
reached the constitutional question on a statute similar to Title VII). Justice Brennan
then concluded that nothing in the act or its legislative history "implies any congres-
sional intent to grant defendants the right to a jury trial...." Id. (emphasis added). It
is not clear if the Court meant by this that it would refrain from considering intent to
deny jury trials, if the Court only looks at the question from the perspective of the
moving party, or if it looks in both directions.
137. Id. at 424. The Court noted that the government could seek legal or equitable
relief under separate subsections of the remedies provision, but if it chose to pursue
both, a jury would be provided "on the legal claim, including all issues common to
both." Id. at 425 (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n. 11). A tension between this hold-
ing and lines that precede it (noting that courts of chancery at common law could pro-
vide monetary awards "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief") exists only
insofar as the Court, in rejecting the government's claim, stated as one of three "flaws"
the fact that a $22 million penalty "hardly can be considered incidental to the modest
equitable relief in this case."
138. The Court recently addressed the "intertwining remedies" issue in the labor
law context. See Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990). See supra
note 94 discussing action under section 301 of the LMRA. Superficially, the Court's
reliance on Tull for the notion that a monetary award "incidental to or intertwined with
injunctive relief may be equitable" suggests a reverse in doctrine. Terry, 110 S. Ct. at
1348. Justice Brennan in Tull, however, further stated that the right to jury trial "can-
not be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as 'incidental' to the equitable relief
sought." Tull, 481 U.S. at 425. Taken together, the two passages from Tull signify that
incidental claims can be equitable, but not on account of being intertwined with or
incidental to something else.
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Lastly, the Tull court quoted Porter v. Warner Holding Co. ,139 limit-
ing restitution to "restoring the status quo and ordering the return of
that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant."'" In the
context of Porter, the word "and" can only be read as joining, not dis-
tinguishing segments. 4 ' That is, the "and" means "by," not "or."142
Through its reference to Porter, the Tull court implicitly defined resti-
tution in its properly narrow sense.143
The Supreme Court in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg " adjudi-
cated issues in a field also far removed from employment discrimina-
tion, namely "traditionally equitable" bankruptcy proceedings. In
Granfinanciera, the trustee for a bankrupt coffee company sued two
South American entities to void allegedly fraudulent transfers of
money, made before it filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.145 The
bankruptcy court denied defendants' motion for jury trial, which the
district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. 146 Following a
bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the seventh
amendment applied to this type of proceeding. 47
In an opinion joined by six other justices, 48 Justice Brennan held
139. 328 U.S. 395 (1946). In Porter, the government sued under the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 to enjoin landlord overcharges and order excess rent returned
to tenants. Id. at 395.
140. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at 402).
141. The isolated passage in Porter quoted by the Court obscures this distinction.
In Tull, the Court quotes, "restitution is limited to 'restoring the status quo and order-
ing the return ..... " Id. at 424. The original text reads as follows: "When the Admin-
istrator seeks restitution ... he asks the court to act in the public interest by restoring
the status quo and ordering the return.. . ." Porter, 328 U.S. at 402.
142. Porter stands for the idea that restitution has a specific and clear meaning. It
does not comprise a free-ranging redistribution of money to restore the status quo, but
rather the repatriation of wrongful profits.
143. See supra notes 81-99 and accompanying text discussing restitution and back
pay.
144. 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989).
145. Id. at 2787.
146. Id. at 2787-88. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned: 1) whereas the bankruptcy
code specifically allowed for jury trials only for tort actions, the constructive fraud pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1982 under which plaintiff brought action was silent on
jury trials, 2) actions to void fraudulent conveyances, and bankruptcy proceedings in
general, are by nature equitable and 3) Congress designated fraudulent conveyance ac-
tions as "core proceedings," to be tried by judges without juries. Id.
147. Id. at 2788.
148. Justice Scalia concurred separately, Justice White filed a dissent, and Justice
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that defendants sued for fraudulent conveyances in bankruptcy actions,
who have made no claims against the bankruptcy estate, are entitled to
jury trials under the seventh amendment. The seventh amendment dic-
tated this result, despite the fact that Congress designated such actions
as "core" proceedings to be tried to judges alone, and that bankruptcy
courts are non-article III tribunals.' 49
The Court in Granfinanciera picked up where Tull left off, further
refining seventh amendment analysis and reemphasizing its impor-
tance. Justice Brennan began by holding that the statute's ambiguous
references to trial by jury justified deciding the case directly under the
seventh amendment. 150 In its historical analysis, the Court demanded
more precision than respondent pled, rejecting in course its overly
broad analogy to equitable actions voiding fraudulent transfers.' 5 ' The
Court similarly rejected the respondent's self-serving definition of the
monetary remedy as "avoidance" and "restitution," rather than
damages. 1
52
Moving to the statutory issue, Justice Brennan noted the constitu-
tional restraints on Congress against eliminating the, right to jury by
transferring a right of action to an administrative or non-article III
Blackmun ified a dissent joined by Justice O'Connor. Both dissents agreed with the
majority up to the point where Granfinanciera became disanalogous to Title VII.
Namely, the dissents' disagreement arose where the Court determined whether Con-
gress could assign the action to a non-Article III tribunal.
149. Article III of the Constitution establishes the system of federal courts, to
which the seventh amendment expressly applies. Congress may create specialized,
"non-Article III" tribunals to hear statutory causes of action which involve "public
rights." Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2796. Public rights originally meant that the
government was a party to the action, but administrative tribunals today cover many
zones of private intercourse affecting commerce. See generally Saphire & Solimine,
Shoring Up Article Il." Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68
B.U.L. REv. 85 (1988) (discussing threat of "legislative courts" to Article III values).
150. Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2789. In contrast to its detailed analysis of his-
torical analogues, the Court relegated to a footnote the Bankruptcy Act's mention of
jury trials. Id. at 2789 n.3. The Court also declined to discuss respondent's supportive
citations to legislative history. Brief for Respondent at 3-6, Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989) (No. 87-1716). As a threshold matter, then, the Court
impliedly held that the language of an act and its legislative history would not foreclose
separate seventh amendment analysis, at least where ambiguities exist.
151. Granfinanciera, 109 S. Ct. at 2791. While courts of equity traditionally pro-
vided relief in suits to void fraudulent preferences, these actions generally concerned
real property and not specie. Id.
152. Id. at 2794 n.7. This sleight of hand amounted to a "strained attempt to cir-
cumvent precedent." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/5
RIGHT TO JURY UNDER TITLE VII
tribunal, such as courts of bankruptcy.153 In this instance, Congress
overstepped its constitutional authority by designating all fraudulent
transfer actions equitable "core" proceedings, irrespective of the rela-
tionship between the trustee and the defendant.' 54
Most important to the Title VII issue, Granfinanciera rejected classi-
fication as a means to subvert the right to a jury trial. As to the distinc-
tion between "core' and "non-core" proceedings, the Court
pronounced:
This purely taxonomic change cannot alter our seventh amend-
ment analysis. Congress cannot eliminate a party's seventh
amendment right to a jury trial by merely relabelling the cause of
action to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an
administrative agency or specialized court of equity. 5 '
Similarly, Congress cannot defeat the right to jury trial under Title VII
by expressly permitting recovery of damages, followed by the words,
"and other equitable relief." '15 6 As in Tull, the Court closely scruti-
nized congressional determinations. In both cases, the Court gave no
effect to indications that Congress rejected the right to trial by jury.
V. PROPOSAL
The right to jury trial does not, and should not, turn on the social
desirability of protecting one class of persons against another. The
right is too precious to subordinate to politics. 5 Similarly, how par-
153. Id. at 2795. The Court stated that Congress could only deny the right to jury
"in actions at law.., where 'public rights' are litigated." Id. (citing Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450, 458 (1977)). The
Court defined "public rights" as statutory rights that are "integral parts of a public
regulatory scheme, assigned to administrative bodies or special courts of equity." Id. at
2799 n.10. The Court then held that the plaintiff's action to recover a fraudulent con-
veyance was not a "public right," because the action was peripheral to the bankruptcy
proceeding (defendant was not a creditor). Id. at 2798. Justice Scalia dissented insofar
as he thought public rights could only exist where the government was a party in the
suit. Id. at 2802 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. Id. at 2800. The Court also rejected an expressio unis construction of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Code only grants the right to jury trial for personal injury or
wrongful death actions against the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 2789 n.3.
155. Id. at 2800.
156. See supra note 23 for text of Title VII.
157. The right to trial by jury played a central role in the American system of jus-
tice from the start. See W. NELSON, supra note 64, at 96 ("For Americans after the
Revolution, as well as before, the right to trial by jury was probably the most valued of
all civil rights.").
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ties to civil actions articulate the relief they seek bears no relevance to
the seventh amendment issue.1 58 The proposed test that follows, sug-
gested by Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg159 and Tull v. United
States,16° assumes that the Supreme Court preserves the right to trial
by jury where the problem admits of no easy resolution under tradi-
tional seventh amendment analysis. 161 Title VII presents one such
case, where a controverted remedy stands beside an equitable remedy.
Under the proposed test, 162 the court would find a right to trial by
jury where the statute grants one or where the legislative history
clearly shows that Congress meant to provide such a right. Otherwise,
the court would first subject each "cause" (defined as an action for a
particular remedy)1 63 to a strict, historical analysis. Next, the court
would separately analyze each remedy. In doing so, the court would
use an "as likely legal than not" standard. 16" If the remedy is clearly
legal, either party would have the right to jury. If the remedy is inde-
terminate and the cause historically equitable, no jury would be avail-
able. Where both are indeterminate, the court would award the tie to
158. See supra note 152 and accompanying text discussing Court's rejection of an
argument based on artfully defined remedies.
159. See supra notes 144-56 and accompanying text discussing Granfinanciera.
160. See supra notes 116-43 and accompanying text discussing Tull.
161. See supra note 54 and accompanying text explaining the presumption in favor
of jury trial.
162.






= either jury, or jury unless legislative history indicates that there should
be no right to trial by jury
163. In a merged system of law and equity, the remedy and cause are the same
thing, defined from either end of the lawsuit.
164. If the remedy resembles more closely a remedy traditionally in equity, it would
be equitable. If not, it would be legal. Toss-up cases provisionally would go to a finding
of a remedy at law, until the court completes its historical analysis.
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the right to jury trial.165 The court would, under no circumstances,
resort to policy considerations to break ties.
The proposed test would dispense with Justice Brennan's vague "bal-
ancing test," which makes little sense in that one half weighs consider-
ably more than the other.16 6 Because of its diminished role for
legislative intent, the test would also encourage Congress to identify
more clearly the seventh amendment implications of the statutory
rights of action it creates.
VI. THE RENEGADE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
The Northern District of Alabama after Beesley v. Hartford Fire In-
surance Company 167 stands alone as the only federal court to consist-
ently grant jury trials in Title VII actions for back pay.
16
Notwithstanding its tepid reception, 169 Beesley and its progeny war-
rant close inspection due to the continued general absence from Title
VII decisions of any systematic seventh amendment analysis. 7 ' The
165. An alternative method to break the tie would be to find for a right to jury trial,
unless the legislative history clearly indicated that there should be no such right. An-
other possible "tie-breaker" might be the third factor in Bernhard, viz the relative ca-
pacity of a jury to understand and fairly rule on the issues of fact presented by the
individual case. See supra note 47 and accompanying text describing the Bernhard sev-
enth amendment test.
166. See supra note 48 and accompanying text explaining that remedy analysis is
more important than historical analysis. Justice Brennan later advanced a streamlined
seventh amendment analysis. Speaking for himself, Justice Brennan would have aban-
doned that much of the historical analysis which analogizes modern claims to pre-1789
forms of action. Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1350 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("there remains little pur-
pose to our rattling through dusty attics of ancient writs"). Justice Brennan would have
applied historical analysis to the remedy alone, before turning to the more important,
modern remedies analysis. In essence, Justice Brennan reformulated the seventh
amendment test as a two-part remedies analysis.
167. 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala.), motion to vacate denied, 723 F. Supp. 635 (N.D.
Ala. 1989).
168. Following Beesley, the Northern District granted requests for jury trials under
Title VII in two reported decisions, Walker v. Anderson Elect. Connectors, 736 F.
Supp. 253 (N.D. Ala. 1990) and Walton v. Crown Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.
Ala. 1990).
169. Other districts have found Beesley's rationale unpersuasive. See Kozam v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 739 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Zowayyed v. Lowen Co., 735
F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1990); Mann v. J.E. Baker Co., 733 F. Supp. 885, 892 (M.D.
Pa. 1990) ("[w]e adhere to the belief that there is no right to a jury trial in Title VII
cases").
170. Amongst others, Kozam, 739 F. Supp. 307, rejected Beesley without supplying
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court in Beesley undertook a seventh amendment analysis from the
ground up. Under the remedies test, Judge Acker debunked the re-
ceived wisdom on back pay, adopting the amicus view that this remedy
"is clearly a measure of defendant's loss more akin to damages than it
is to restitution. '171 For historical analogues, the court settled on the
"number of tort actions" at common law identified by Justice Marshall
in Curtis v. Loether.172
The court also described Supreme Court decisions which problema-
tized the prevailing judicial attitude towards Title VII remedies.17
Despite a steady stream of Supreme Court dicta pointing in the oppo-
site direction,1 74 the court found that the Court's holdings interpreting
other federal statutes supported Anita Beesley's position that jury trials
were available under Title VII.
The Northern District started its survey with Curtis v. Loether,
175
which recognized the right to trial by jury under a statute substantially
similar to Title VII.1 76 Next, Judge Acker held that the Court in Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 177 tacitly endorsed the right to jury trial
an alternative seventh amendment analysis. The district court deferred to the "well
established" rule in the fifth circuit that no right to a jury trial exists. Id. at 314.
171. Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 644 (quoting amicus brief for plaintiff). See supra
notes 77-105 and accompanying text discussing nature of back pay claim.
172. Beesley, 723 F. Supp, at 643. See infra note 25 discussing Curtis.
173. The Court's decisions in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) and
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782 (1989), "represent the present
Supreme Court's crescendo of renewed recognition of the power and importance of the
Seventh Amendment.... ." Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 643. See supra notes 119-60 and
accompanying text discussing Tull and Granfinanciera. As against this relatively
guarded language, Judge Acker held in the first Beesley opinion that the pair "by clear
and necessary implication overruled all prior circuit and district court decisions" deny-
ing the right to a jury trial in Title VII actions. Beesley, 717 F. Supp. at 784.
174. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981) ("And of course.... there
is no right to a trial by jury in cases arising under Title VII." [citing cases]); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-85 (1978); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). Shortly
after the Northern District of Alabama rendered its decision in Beesley, the Court in
Teamsters, Local 391 v. Terry, 110 S. Ct. 1339, 1348 (1990) repeated this dictum to
distinguish section 301 actions for back pay from Title VII actions for back pay. None-
theless, the Northern District of Alabama chose not to reverse Beesley in Walton v.
Cowin Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1990). See infra notes 188-94 and
accompanying text discussing Walton.
175. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
176. See supra note 25 discussing Curtis v. Loether. According to the court, the
similarities between Title VII and Title VIII "far outweighed" the differences. Beesley,
723 F. Supp. at 641.
177. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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under Title VII by its references to back pay as "compensation" (rather
than restitution) and relief for a "legal injury." ' Judge Acker made
the same observation'79 with respect to Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union.180 Dicta in Patterson equating section 1981 remedies with Title
VII remedies suggested that "the Court must have meant that those
remaining Title VII remedies include the remedy of trial by jury." '
Having concluded that the seventh amendment provides for a jury
trial in Title VII actions for back pay, the Beesley court supplied a
'further policy argument for its outcome. Judge Acker took judicial
notice of changed historical conditions in Alabama,1 8 2 which under-
mined the rationale of well-meaning federal judges who shielded dis-
crimination victims from juries of their peers.1
8 3
In two subsequent decisions penned by Judge Acker, the Northern
District of Alabama reexamined its holding in Beesley. In Walton v.
Cowin Equipment Co. ," the defendant in a Title VII action asserted
178. Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 644 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418-21). The Court
also compared Title VII's remedial scheme to that of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988), under which plaintiffs are entitled to jury trials in
suits for back pay. Id. See supra note 109 discussing back pay under the FLSA.
References to back pay as "compensatory damages" in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), a case interpreting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
might similarly support an argument for jury trial under Title VI and, consequently,
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See supra note 17 discussing Title VI and
section 504. But see George v. Brock, 827 F.2d. 1426 (10th Cir. 1987) (no right to jury
trial under Rehabilitation Act).
179. Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 646.
180. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). See supra note 37 discussing Patterson.
181. Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 646. Before Patterson, section 1981 had provided
many Title VII plaintiffs with a pendent claim triable to a jury. See supra note 37
discussing Patterson's effect on section 1981 actions.
Judge Acker's reading of Patterson is flawed by his inaccurate description of jury trial
as a "remedy" and by his inconsistent and self-serving approach towards Supreme
Court dicta. See Beesley, 723 F. Supp. at 643 ("there has never been a holding by the
Supreme Court on the subject"). More troubling, he seems to endorse for purposes of
relying on Patterson the very seventh amendment analysis-by-labels which elsewhere he
(properly) rejects. Id. at 638-39 (rejecting reference to "court" in Title VII as meaning
"judge").
182. The first Beesley opinion detailed profound social changes that took place
within the Northern District of Alabama since 1964. Beesley, 717 F. Supp. at 782.
Upon rehearing the jury issue, Judge Acker evidently felt that his judgment rested sol-
idly on the law, and omitted this justification for allowing jury trials.
183. See supra note 32 and accompanying text discussing early Title VII case law.
184. 733 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
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that an Eleventh Circuit case, Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc.,185
effectively overruled Beesley. 8 6 Although Sherman repeated the ma-
jority view on jury trials for Title VII, "7 Judge Acker adroitly ducked
the full blow of that case's holding. 8 In its defense, the Northern
District used as further ammunition two Supreme Court opinions sub-
sequent to the Sherman decision. The Court in both Teamsters, Local
No. 391 v. Terry 189 and Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc. 19o as-
sumed for purposes of the decision that there is no right to jury trial
under Title VII, but expressly stated no opinion on the right.
In Walker v. Anderson Electrical Connectors, 9' the Northern Dis-
trict reexamined its holding in Beesley yet again, now equipped with
the Supreme Court's decision in Yellow Freight Systems v. Donnelly. 
1 92
Judge Acker's opinion in Walker consisted of a five-part argument,
concluding that Donnelly vindicates the Northern District's findings in
Beesley. Firstly, Donnelly dramatically showed that the prevailing ju-
dicial attitude on any Title VII issue does not guarantee that construc-
tion's ultimate correctness. 93 Secondly, Title VII is as mute on the
185. 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990).
186. Walton, 733 F. Supp. at 328.
187. The Sherman court stated, in dicta, that "[plaintiff] had no right to a jury trial
of his section 2000e-2(a)(1) claim [because] [t]he law provides that such a claim lies in
equity .. " Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1529 n.4. Sherman held that Patterson v. McLean
required the court to set aside punitive damages awarded by a jury in a combined Title
VII and section 1981 action, because the plaintiff failed to state a post-Patterson claim
under section 1981, and because Title VII does not authorize such relief. Id. at 1535.
The court let stand back pay damages amounting to $10,000. Id.
188. In an act ofjudicial defiance comparable to General Custer's last stand, Judge
Acker stated that Sherman's dicta would not bind his court. Apart from the fact that
Sherman did not expressly rule on the jury issue, Judge Acker first noted Sherman's
description of back pay as "compensatory damages." Walton, 733 F. Supp. at 331. He
then cited Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988), where the court
awarded what could only be described as damages in an action "implied" by Title VII
to an ex-employee whose former employer had blacklisted him. Walton, 733 F. Supp.
at 332. Moreover Sherman, as with Bailey, must have awarded damages in some form
because the $10,000 recovery went beyond the plaintiff's lost wages. Id.
189. 110 S. Ct. 1339 (1990).
190. 110 S. Ct. 1331 (1990).
191. 736 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
192. 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990). The Donnelly Court unanimously held that state
courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over Title VII claims. Id.
193. Walker, 736 F. Supp. at 255. Prior to Donnelly, most authorities thought that
federal courts enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII cases. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 679 (1983) ("the plaintiff may
forego the Title VII cause of action and proceed in state court").
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topic of exclusive jurisdiction as on jury trials.194 Thirdly, the Court in
Donnelly emphasized that only affirmative congressional action could
"divest state courts of their presumptively concurrent jurisdiction." '195
Fourthly, the implicit holding in Donnelly that state courts can fairly
adjudicate Title VII claims, without the federal judiciary's "alleged ex-
pertise" in the field of civil rights, undercuts the argument that juries
also lack competence to decide such matters. 19 6 Lastly, in view of the
preclusive effect of state court proceedings over Title VII actions19 7
and the comment in Donnelly that state court procedures (which in-
clude jury trials under many state civil rights laws) are compatible with
Title VII procedures, the Court laid the cornerstone for a construction
of Title VII that recognizes the right to trial by jury.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has never held that jury trials are never avail-
able in Title VII actions for back pay. The recent rulings in Tull and
Granfinanciera go beyond merely summarizing the Court's prior appli-
cation of the seventh amendment to statutory rights of action. They
substantively alter the historical and remedies analyses, tilting the bal-
ance in favor of jury trials in situations that do not lend themselves to
ready determinations. Most importantly, congressional intent to grant
or deny the right to jury is no longer sacrosanct. Indeed, it may only
operate unidirectionally to support a decision to grant a trial by jury.
Although Title VII has remained the same,19 society has undergone
194. Walker, 736 F. Supp. at 255.
195. Id (quoting Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. at 1568). Unless Congress expressly and
permissibly limits a right, the Court will default to the constitution and adopt the statu-
tory construction which best preserves the constitutional interest at stake. Parties to
suits in federal court are presumptively entitled to jury trials. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text discussing presumption favoring jury trials.
196. Id. at 255-56 (citing Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. at 1570).
197. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 193, at 1050-51 (state fair employ-
ment act decision on merits collaterally estops subsequent adjudication under Title
VII). See also Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (state court deci-
sion entitled to full faith and credit).
198. Justice Brennan defined the meaning of legislative silence in the face of judicial
interpretation: "[W]e have often taken Congress' subsequent inaction as probative to
varying degrees, depending on the circumstances of its acquiescence." Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2385 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As applied
to Title VII, Congress tacitly approved of the denial of jury trials through the early
1970s, when the fear of racial bias remained high. By the late 1970s and 1980s, congres-
sional "acquiescence" meant something entirely different, because by then plaintiffs
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a remarkable transformation since the dark days of 1964.199 The draft-
ers of Title VII rendered the enforcement language vague, allowing the
courts to define its procedures.2"0 Exploiting this vagueness, the
Northern District of Alabama in Beesley v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. 201 improved Title VII and depoliticized seventh amendment analy-
sis in the process. In doing so, the court correctly stated the law under
Title VII and the seventh amendment.2°
Charles A. Horowitz*
could secure jury trials by pleading pendent claims under 45 U.S.C. § 1981. In the
wake of the Court's decision in Patterson, effectively eliminating the section 1981 op-
tion, Congress considered, as part of the failed 1990 Civil Rights Act, provisions restor-
ing broad rights under that section, and permitting jury trials under Title VII. See
supra note 4 discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1990.
199. The recent election of America's first black governor in Virginia points to a
larger trend, observable in different areas of public and private life since at least the mid-
1970s. See Barone & Borger, The End of the Civil War, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 20, 1989, at 45. As early as 1973, Justice Powell noted the success of school
desegregation in the South since the Court renounced "separate but equal" in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 438 (1954), stating that while "substantial progress to-
ward achieving integration has been made in Southern States.. .", schools in many
Northern and Western cities remain de facto segregated. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). But see Newman & Wilson, Promise and Performance of Arbitration from a
Union Point of View, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 1205 (June 6, 1983) ('The simple
fact is that employment discrimination has been illegal under the Civil Rights Act for
over 19 years, but employment discrimination continues to be rampant.").
200. See supra note 27 discussing Title VII drafted to be purposely vague.
201. See supra notes 167-83 and accompanying text discussing Beesley.
202. Beesley's ruling advances the cause of civil rights by infusing public morality
into the adjudicative process. Taken to its extreme, however, Beesley could cause unto-
ward effects on other civil rights laws. For instance, if back pay must always constitute
relief at law, then government employees suing the state under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 win
never be permitted to recover monetary judgments. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (the eleventh amendment bars recovery of damages
against the government).
* J.D. 1991, Washington University.
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